We present a preliminary study of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA software running on GPUs. We show how an attacker can overrun a buffer to corrupt sensitive data or steer the execution flow by overwriting function pointers, e.g., manipulating the virtual table of a C++ object. In view of a potential mass market diffusion of GPU accelerated software this may be a major concern.
Introduction
General-Purpose Computing on Graphics Processing Units (GPGPU) has become very popular in recent years. Modern graphics processing units (GPUs) are many-core accelerators for massively parallel applications rather than simply 2D and 3D graphics rendering coprocessors as in the past. Hardware/software platforms for GPGPU like Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) [9] and open computing language (OpenCL) [2, 5] allow developers to program graphics cards in languages like C/C++ or Fortran through application program interfaces (APIs) and language extensions. Notice that classic graphics APIs as open graphics library (OpenGL) [6] and Microsoft DirectX run on the same GPU architecture as CUDA or OpenCL APIs. The difference is that the latter expose more functionalities of the underlying hardware providing the necessary flexibility to support general purpose parallel applications.
CUDA and OpenCL have been used to accelerate a variety of scientific applications in the recent past and their use to speed-up commodity applications (e.g., web appli-B Andrea Miele andrea.miele@epfl.ch 1 LACAL, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland cations [7]) or operating systems can be expected in the near future [16] . For instance the KGPU project [4] is a GPU computing framework for the Linux kernel. Such a system allows the kernel to run code on GPUs directly, so that compute intensive operating system tasks can be accelerated. As a consequence, questions about the security of code running on these platforms have become relevant. This may become even more critical in view of future tight integration of CPU and GPU architectures and use of GPUs in the cloud [1] . So far the security of GPU code has been somehow touched upon only considering GPUs as accelerators for malware [12, 17] and more recently information leakage through side channels [14] , but as far as we know no one has explored potential vulnerabilities of GPU code and their exploitation. A natural question that arises is whether or not classic C/C++ "buffer" overflow vulnerabilities [3, 11, 13] can be exploited. Leveraging a vulnerability to run arbitrary code on central processing units (CPUs) usually aims at interacting with the operating system via system calls to perform privilege escalation. In the context of GPUs there is no notion of operating system and the code runs on many cores across a large number of threads. Thus, the concept of exploit assumes a different dimension. The presence of vulnerabilities in GPU drivers has been exploited for privilege escalation, however this is different from the case of exploiting code running on a GPU. In the latter case the ultimate goal of an attacker may be tampering with a parallel computation to maliciously affect the outcome or to force one or more threads to jump to specific parts of the code.
The study of this problem on current GPUs is hindered by the lack of documentation on low level details of the hardware/software interfaces. The actual ISA of GPUs is usually not exposed by vendors who provide, in some cases, only virtual low level assembly [10] . Recently NVIDIA has released a disassembler for their binary executable format and a list of ISA instructions [8] . The latter, though, does not include a description of their syntax and functioning. Consequently, the analysis of GPU software vulnerabilities has to rely on "trial and error" experiments and reverse engineering.
In this paper we present a preliminary study of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in CUDA software. In particular we show how a buffer overrun can be exploited to overwrite function pointers (e.g., to manipulate the virtual table of a C++ object) to steer the execution flow. An attacker can hijack each call to specific functions to other functions in the code of his/her choice or perform limited return orient programming (ROP) [15] . We hope that our results will act as a wake-up call for the community as we believe that GPU software security will soon become an extremely relevant problem. The source code of this project will be made freely available.
Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA)
In this section we give a brief overview of CUDA. CUDA [9] is a computing platform, consisting in both a hardware and a software architecture, enabling NVIDA GPUs to support general purpose computing. At the programming level CUDA consists of extensions to the C/C++ language, libraries and some specific data types that enable the programmer to compute on the GPU. An actual function call mechanism exists and defining recursive functions is possible. Moreover, object oriented programming (OOP) is possible through a subset of C++ constructs that are supported. In CUDA programs the code that runs on the GPU is enclosed in a special function called kernel. A kernel is executed in the form of multiple parallel instances corresponding to a set of parallel threads. Threads are grouped in blocks and blocks are grouped in grids:
thread: A thread executes one instance of the kernel, and it is uniquely identified inside its block by a thread identifier. Each thread has its program counter, registers, per-thread private memory, input, and output results. -block: A block is a set of concurrently executing threads that can cooperate among themselves through synchronization and shared memory. Each thread block has a private per-block shared memory space used for interthread communication, data sharing, and result sharing in parallel algorithms. grid: A grid is an array of thread blocks that execute the same kernel, read inputs from global memory, write results to global memory, and synchronize between dependent kernel calls. The GPU executes a kernel as a grid of parallel thread blocks.
This hierarchal grouping scheme allows CUDA applications to scale across different device models. See [9] for more details.
Practical analysis
In this section we present our practical analysis through two examples. We will consider the presently common CPU/GPU interaction model in which the CPU and GPUs work on separate physical memory. The CPU loads the input data into the GPU memory and then runs the GPU kernel that will process these data and produce output data. A soon as the kernel terminates, the CPU copies the produced output from the GPU memory to the CPU memory. We will not explore the case where CPU and GPU are somehow integrated and share the same memory.
In our first example we show how function pointers in static memory can be overwritten to have each thread call a function that should normally not be callable. In our second example we show how the virtual table (VTABLE) of a C++ object in dynamic memory can be manipulated for the same purpose. Table 1 shows the specifications of the platform we have used for our experiments.
A stack overflow
Consider the following fragment of CUDA code (the qualifier device denotes a function that is called by threads running on the GPU). The function unsafe is vulnerable to a buffer overflow (the array buf can be overridden if the attacker has control over the variables string and len). It computes a hash value of the input (using the djb2 algorithm of D.J. Bernstein) and uses such value reduced modulo 8 to select and call one of the first 8 "dummy" functions. The code of the simple CUDA kernel using the unsafe functions is the following: The memory layout is shown in Fig. 1 . It is possible to use cuda-gdb or disassemble the binary with cuobjdump to figure out what are the addresses of the dummy functions. For instance on our platform the function dummy9 has address 0x4e0. This address is relative to the base address of the code section and does not change across multiple executions. We launch our kernel on one thread with value pointed by admin set to zero (we omit the very simple host code for the sake of clarity) and observe that if we fill the input buffer with at most 26 values (the value of len is set to 26), for instance 26 times 0x4e0, the code prints correctly: Hash[0]: 6666666666666666. If we fill the input buffer with one more value 0x4e0 (the address of dummy9) and set the value of len to 27, the output is instead HELLO ADMIN! Hash[0]: 9999999999999999, thus we have successfully overwritten the function pointers with the address of dummy9. The memory layout after the attack is shown n Fig. 2 . If more than one thread is run we observe that each thread is hijacked to execute dummy9. By looking at the disassembled binary with cuobjdump: we observe that the address 0x4e0 of dummy9 is relative to the base address of the code as mentioned above. The "Branch to Relative Indexed Address" BRX instruction at address 0x03e8 is used to jump to the correct dummy function, whose address is stored in register R0.
It follows that by overwriting the function pointers in fp an attacker can jump to any address in the code memory and so ROP type of exploits are theoretically possible. Notice that the function call and return mechanism is handled with a pre-return PRET instruction followed eventually by a return RET instruction. The PRET instruction presumably stores the return address (again relative to the code base address) at an unknown location.
In conclusion, classic return address overwrite attacks seem not to be feasible and attempts to jump outside the code memory failed (for instance we could not find a way to jump to shellcode injected into the buffer buf). Therefore, we deduce that code and data address spaces are separated and thus simple injected code execution is not possible. However, function pointer manipulation is possible and therefore ROP type of attacks could be mounted. 
A "heap overflow": manipulating the virtual table of a C++ object
Consider the following code where we define a C++ class B with four virtual methods: f1, f2, f3 and f4 and the derived class D defines the above four methods. The function unsafe is very similar to the homonymous function described in Sect. 3.1, but in this case the array buf and a class D object are dynamically allocated. The function is vulnerable to a "heap" overflow as the array buf can be overridden to overwrite the adjacent class D object. The kernel we focus on is also very similar to the kernel presented in Sect. 3.1: __global__ void test_kernel(unsigned long* hashes, unsigned long * input, unsigned int len, int *admin){ unsigned long my_hash; int idx=blockDim.x*blockIdx.x+threadIdx.x; if(*admin) my_hash=secret(); else my_hash=unsafe_hash(input+(len*(idx)),len); hashes[idx]=my_hash; } By instrumenting the code with simple printf calls we have been able to observe the following:
-The addresses of dynamically allocated memory blocks (malloc) or objects (new) are predictable. We have verified by compiling the same code multiple times on our platform that the compiler does not perform address space randomization. In our case, considering the first thread of the first block, the address of the array buf allocated in the function unsafe is always 0xb0513f920. Using the above observations we can exploit the overflow vulnerability to overwrite the VTABLE address of the class D object instantiated in a thread with the address of a "forged" VTABLE (which is stored in buf) containing 4 copies of the address of the function secret. Then the thread is forced to call the function secret.
Focusing on a single thread we have the memory layout showed in Fig. 3 . The exploit is achieved by filling the array buf as depicted in Fig. 4 , namely the first 11 locations of buf must contain the address of the the forged VTABLE, which is in turn stored in buf starting at the 12-th location. We have not discovered any hint suggesting the use of classic malloc linked lists with pointers stored next to the actual data. We leave the exploration of classic malloc and free exploits [3] as future work. 1. The stack grows upwards as opposed to x64 CPUs. 2. Code and data address spaces are separated as in Harvard architectures. 3. Return addresses for function calls are not stored on the stack as on x64 CPUs. 4. No address space randomization is performed by the compiler. 5. ROP exploits are theoretically possible as we proved that at least function pointers can be overwritten.
As OpenCL, OpenGL and DirectX applications can be run on the same GPUs we targeted and therefore on the same instruction set architecture (ISA), vulnerability exploitation should not differ from the CUDA case, provided the attacker can manipulate the input as in our examples. One problem that needs further investigation is the general exploitability of parallel GPU applications. The attacker may try to tamper with a single thread in the case of applications in which each thread performs a task independently of the other threads. Or the attacker may try to affect several threads to maliciously affect the outcome of a computation all threads cooperate to perform.
Conclusion
We have shown that CUDA software running on the latest NVIDIA GPUs can be vulnerable to classic buffer overflow attacks. Buffer overflows in both static and dynamic memory can be exploited to overwrite sensitive data or function pointers (e.g., to manipulate a C++ object virtual table). Our analysis does not expose any concrete threat, however it shows that the exploitation of vulnerabilities in GPU soft-ware is possible. This may become a critical problem in the future if commodity GPGPU software will spread, especially if GPUs and CPUs will be tightly integrated.
